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S. 133: OHIO'S PUBLIC-SECTOR COLLECTIVE-BARGAINING
FRAMEWORK
I.

INTRODUCTION

2
With the enactment of S. 133,1 Ohio revoked the Ferguson Act
which prohibited strikes by public employees, and adopted a comprehensive collective-bargaining statute governing labor relations in the
public sector. Considering the large amount of public employment in
Ohio, the adoption of a comprehensive law governing labor relations
between public employers and public employees is certain to create
controversy. For example, since collective bargaining has existed in
Ohio without the guidance of any legislative framework,3 the very necessity of S. 133 may be questioned. The provisions of S. 133 which
control the collective-bargaining process will also create controversy
over their interpretation and implementation:
The process of collective bargaining constitutes a complex and intricate procedure well beyond the scope of this note." However, this
note will attempt to furnish a historical perspective of the factors and
decisions which prompted passage of this bill, an overview of the act's
major provisions, and an analysis of the bill's more controversial provisions-the right to strike and binding arbitration.

II.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Public-Sector Collective Bargaining in the United States

Private-sector collective bargaining has been accepted and utilized
in the United States for nearly five decades.6 However, public-sector
collective bargaining did not receive legislative authorization until
1959. 6 Today, some form of public-sector collective bargaining is statu1. Act of July 7, 1983, 1983 Ohio Legis. Sery. 5-237 (Baldwin) (to be codified in scattered
sections of chs. I and 41 OHIO REV. CODE ANN.).
For a general outline of the developing law of collective bargaining in Ohio, see generally 2
PuB. EMPLOYEE BARGAINING REP. (CCH) 1 26,001-26,305 (1983); 1 PUB. EMPLOYEE BARGAINING REP. (CCH) 1 436 passim (1984); 3 PUB. EMPLOYEE BARGAINING REP. (CCH) (1984).
2. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-.05 (Page 1980), repealed by Act of July 7, 1983, §
2, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-237, 5-245 (Baldwin).
3. See infra notes 10-25 and accompanying text.
4. For a detailed explanation of the collective-bargaining procedure in the public sector, see
M. MOSKOW, J. LOEWENBERG & E. KOZIARA, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT (1970).
5. See generally T. BROOKS, TOIL AND TROUBLE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR (2d ed.
1971).
6. Wisconsin was the first state to adopt a comprehensive collective-bargaining statute governing public employees. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.70-.71 (West 1974 & Supp. 1979-1980).
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torily recognized in nearly every state.7 With Ohio's enactment of S.
133, there are now only ten states without some form of legislative authorization of collective-bargaining procedures. 8 However, despite the
quantity of existing public-sector statutes, there is little uniformity
among the collective-bargaining statutes found in each state.9 This lack
of uniformity may well create difficulties in referring to other states'
collective-bargaining statutes in any attempt to interpret Ohio's new
collective-bargaining law.
B.

Public-Sector Collective Bargaining in Ohio

Prior to S. 133, Ohio's statutory law lacked any legal framework
authorizing collective-bargaining procedures between governmental
employers and their employees. In fact, prior to S. 133 there were only
two Ohio statutes covering public employer-employee relations.10 The

Ferguson Act, repealed by S. 133, neither recognized nor established

any collective-bargaining procedures. This statute merely prohibited
strikes by public employees and created sanctions for those employees

rehired after dismissal. 1 Section 9.41 of the Ohio Revised Code,

passed in 1959, provided public employees with the required legislative
authorization to honor voluntary checkoffs' 2 on the wages of public employees for payment of union dues." Although the checkoff provision
7. By 1981, 39 states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands had statutes providing legal frameworks governing collective-bargaining procedures for some or all of their governmental employees. [I Reference File] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 51:501-30 (Apr. 20, 1981).
8. The 10 states which do not authorize collective bargaining in the public sector are: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia. Id.
9. For example, some states have adopted mandatory collective-bargaining procedures,

while other states have adopted permissive collective-bargaining procedures. 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 670,

672-73 (1976). Furthermore, only a few states with collective-bargaining statutes grant a right to

strike to their public employees. With the passage of S. 133, Ohio becomes the ninth state to
authorize a limited right to strike. The other states permitting some type of limited right to strike
are: Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1983)); Hawaii (HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12 (1976));
Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.64 (West Supp. 1984)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 3931-201 (1983)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 243.726 (1983)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, § 11.01.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1984)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730 (1978)); Wisconsin (WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (West Supp. 1984)).
10.

The only two statutes concerning public employer/employee relations were: (1) the Fer-

guson Act, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-.05 (Page 1980), repealed by Act of July 7, 1983,
§ 2, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-237, 5-245 (Baldwin); and (2) OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41 (Page
1978), repealed by Act of July 7, 1983, § 2, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-237, 5-245 (Baldwin).
11. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-.05 (Page 1980), repealed by Act of July 7, 1983, §
2, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-237, 5-245 (Baldwin).

12.

Checkoffs, as used in this statute, constitute deductions from the employee's salary.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41 (Page 1978), repealed by Act of July 7, 1983, § 2, 1983 Ohio

Legis. Serv. 5-237, 5-245 (Baldwin).
13. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 9.41 (Page 1978), repealed by Act of July 7, 1983, § 2, 1983
Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-237, 5-245 (Baldwin).
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may arguably be interpreted as implicit statutory recognition of public
employees' right to unionize and engage in collective bargaining," it
had been widely accepted that a public employer lacked authority to
negotiate a contract or enter into an agreement with its employees.15
Despite the absence of state law recognizing collective bargaining
in Ohio's public sector, a substantial amount of collective bargaining
has occurred in Ohio between governmental employers and employees.
A recent report by the Ohio Legislative Service Commission1" indicates
that in 1977,17 Ohio had 3,33318 public jurisdictions1 9 at both state and
local levels.2 0 Out of these jurisdictions, roughly 23.2% engaged in
some type of labor relations characterized by the Census Bureau as
"collective bargaining. '" Although 23.2% is not an overwhelming
amount of collective-bargaining activity, the commission believes that
the actual number of employees involved in collective bargaining is significant. For example, 1977 statistics reveal that out of "580,371 public
employees in the state, 232,896, roughly half, [engaged] in some type
of collective bargaining unit and 195,638 were covered by [some type]
of contractual agreement. ''2 According to the commission's report, the
degree of activity varies among the different jurisdictions. 3 For example, school districts and municipalities have larger volumes of collective
bargaining in relation to other jurisdictions . 2 Based on these statistics,

14. In Youngstown Educ. -Ass'n v. Youngstown Bd. of Educ., 36 Ohio App. 2d 35, 301
N.E.2d 891 (1973), the Mahoning County Court of Appeals specifically stated that "R.C. 9.41
authorizes a board of education to enter into a binding collective bargaining agreement." Id. at
43, 301 N.E.2d at 897 (Lynch, J., concurring).
15. J. LEWIS & S. SPIRN, OHIO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW 4 (1983).

16. OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM'N, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN OHIO FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1983) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
The commission recognizes these statistics may be somewhat dated. However, the statisbeen taken from the most recent survey available, and as the commission notes, remain
the point being made. Id. at I n.l.
A 1983 publication establishes that Ohio had 3,353 governmental units in 1983. BuREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1982-1983, at 294 (103d ed. 1983). An increase of only 20 governmental units between 1977 and
1982 supports the commission's contention that the 1977 data remain a reliable source upon
which to base its conclusions.
19. "Public jurisdiction," as used by the commission, refers to the "state government and its
various instrumentalities, counties, municipalities, townships, school districts, and special districts." OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM'N, supra note 16, at 2.
20. Id. (citing BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & LABOR-MANAGEMENT
SERVS. AD., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Series GSS No. 100, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: 1979, at 49 (1980)).
21. OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM'N, supra note 16, at 2.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. The commission's report breaks down the various public jurisdictions and establishes the
degree of collective bargaining which occurred in 1982: school districts-63.9%; municipalities-39.8%; special districts-35.9%; state government-21.5%; counties-12.6%; and town-

17.
tics have
valid for
18.
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the commission concluded that prior to the passage of S. 133, extensive
collective bargaining was occurring throughout Ohio's public-sector labor force without legislative approval or supervision.2"
In an effort to provide a legal framework for collective bargaining,
the Ohio General Assembly has frequently attempted to incorporate a
collective-bargaining provision into Ohio law. In 1970, a comprehensive
collective-bargaining bill, patterned after Pennsylvania's collective-bargaining bill, was introduced in the general assembly for the first time."
However, this bill never received attention after committee. 7 Further
attempts to pass a comprehensive collective-bargaining bill were also
unsuccessful" until the passage of S. 133.
Despite the absence of legislative legitimization or regulation of
public employees' collective-bargaining powers, Ohio courts had delineated the parameters of public-sector collective bargaining prior to S.
133.19 The courts have generally recognized the legality of collectivebargaining agreements and have formulated policies regarding content
and procedures. 30
The first Ohio Supreme Court decision regarding public-sector collective bargaining, Hagerman v. City of Dayton,3 1 did not provide encouragement for bargaining procedures in the public-employment area.
At issue in Hagermans" was the legality of a Dayton city ordinance
authorizing a voluntary dues checkoff system for public employees. In
striking down the ordinance,"3 the court concluded that the municipality was operating beyond the confines of its constitutionally permitted
police power.3 4 In the most sweeping language denouncing the validity
of any collective-bargaining agreement, the court stated that "It]here is
no municipal purpose served by the checkoff of wages"3 and such a
"check-off is contrary to the spirit and purpose of the civil service
laws

ships-2.5%. Id.
25. Id. at 1.
26. J. LEWIS & S. SPIRN, supra note 15.
27. Id.
28. In both 1975 and 1977 the Ohio General Assembly approved and passed such a bill.
However, on both occasions, the Democrats (supporters of a collective-bargaining bill) were unable to override a gubernatorial veto. Id.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 31-62.
30. Id.
31. 147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E.2d 246 (1947).
32. Id.
33. This decision was statutorily overruled by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41, which authorized voluntary checkoff dues. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41 (Page 1978), repealed by Act of July
7, 1983, § 2, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-237, 5-245 (Baldwin).
34. 147 Ohio St. at 328, 71 N.E.2d at 253.
35. Id.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/12
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of the state." 6 Since the Ohio Constitution provides the necessary authority to create regulations concerning wages, hours, and conditions of
employment for public employees, 7 the court concluded that "[t]here
is no authority for the delegation either by the municipality or the civil
38
service appointees of any functions to any organization of any kind."
39
Thus with its decision in Hagerman, the Ohio Supreme Court had
dictated that any contract between a public employer and a union representing public employees would constitute an unlawful delegation of
the public employer's authority.4 However, subsequent Ohio Supreme
41
Court decisions have rejected this holding.
Although section 9.41,42 authorizing a voluntary checkoff of union
dues, was passed by the general assembly in 1959, and this section had
been interpreted as legislative recognition of public employees' right to
contract with public employers, 43 there was no Ohio Supreme Court
authority upon which to base collective-bargaining rights until the
landmark case of Dayton Classroom Teachers Association v. Dayton
4
Board of Education.4
45
In altering its earlier position in Hagerman, the court in Dayton
Teachers stated in the syllabus that "[a] board of education is vested
with discretionary authority to negotiate and enter into a collective bargaining agreement with its employees, so long as such agreement does
not conflict with or purport to abrogate the duties and responsibilities
' 46
imposed upon the board of education by law." This "discretionary
authority," according to the court, was granted by the general assem47
bly via the broad contractual powers delegated to school boards.
An examination of the powers granted to townships, counties, and
municipalities illustrates that these public bodies possess contractual
authority similar to that which the court found delegated to school
boards. 48 Arguably, contractual authority may be found to exist in almost any public employer. Such an interpretation would acknowledge a

36. Id.
37. OHIO CONST. art. Xv, § 10.
38. 147 Ohio St. at 329, 71 N.E.2d at 254.
39. 147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E.2d 246 (1947).
40. 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 670, 675 (1976).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 42-49.
42. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41 (Page 1978), repealed by Act of July 7, 1983, § 2, 1983
Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-237, 5-245 (Baldwin).
43. 36 Ohio App. 2d 35, 301 N.E.2d 891 (1973).
44. 41 Ohio St. 2d 147, 323 N.E.2d 714 (1975).
45. 147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E.2d 246 (1947).
46. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 127, 323 N.E.2d at 715.
47. Id. at 131-32, 323 N.E.2d at 717.
48. OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM'N, supra note 16, at 3. See also AFSCME Local 1045
v. Polta, 59 Ohio App. 2d 283, 394 N.E.2d 310 (1977).
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broad judicial recognition of collective-bargaining powers in all government employers. However, the Ohio Supreme Court has rejected such
an expansive interpretation.4 9
The courts have gone beyond recognition of the existence of bargaining capacity in the public sector. Ohio courts have also promulgated policies governing the content of ultimate agreements as well as
the negotiation process itself.6 0 For example, in the landmark case of
Dayton Teachers,5 1 the court went beyond recognition of collective-bargaining authority and upheld the validity of a binding grievance arbitration5 2 clause contained in a collective-bargaining agreement.5 3 In
Loveland Education Association v. Loveland City School District
Board of Education,5 4 the supreme court upheld a portion of a collective-bargaining agreement which outlined the negotiation procedures
required for reaching a future collective-bargaining agreement 5 but
placed a limitation on the clause. The court held that a recognition
agreement "is valid and enforceable, so long as such agreement does
not conflict with or purport to abrogate the duties and responsibilities
imposed . . . by law."50 This decision was followed by lower courts
faced with similar preagreement negotiation processes.57
The Ohio Supreme Court has also set guidelines regarding the aspects of the collective-bargaining process. In Civil Service Personnel
Association v. City of Akron, 58 the court promulgated guidelines with
respect to bargaining-unit determination." In this case, the court rec-

49. See Malone v. Court of Common Pleas, 45 Ohio St. 2d 245, 344 N.E.2d 126 (1976)
(wherein- the court applied a narrow definition of "contractual authority," in holding that a juvenile court judge is not authorized to enter into an employment agreement with court employees);
AFSCME, 59 Ohio App. 2d 283, 394 N.E.2d 310 (1977) (wherein the Erie County Court of
Appeals held that in the absence of statutory authority, a county engineer lacked authority to
execute a collective-bargaining agreement).
50. See infra text accompanying notes 51-72.
51. 41 Ohio St. 2d 127, 323 N.E.2d 714 (1975).
52. "Grievance arbitration," as used in this note, refers to arbitration resulting from disputes arising out of an existing contract and is usually limited to violations, misinterpretations, or

misapplications of the agreement. J. LEwis & S. SPIRN, supra note 15, at 142.
53. In the second paragraph of the syllabus, the court specifically states that a binding
grievance arbitration clause must be honored by a public employer where "(1) the grievance involves the application or interpretation of a valid term of the agreement and (2) the arbitrator is
specifically prohibited from making any decision which is inconsistent with the terms of the agreement or contrary to law." 41 Ohio St. 2d at 127, 323 N.E.2d at 715.
54. 58 Ohio St. 2d 31, 387 N.E.2d 1374 (1979).
55. Id. at 36, 387 N.E.2d at 1377.
56. id.
57. See Trotwood Madison Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Trotwood Madison City School
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 52 Ohio App. 2d 39, 367 N.E.2d 1233 (1977); Xenia City Bd. of Educ. v.
Xenia Educ. Ass'n, 52 Ohio App. 2d 373, 370 N.E.2d 756 (1977).
58. 48 Ohio St. 2d 25, 356 N.E.2d 300 (1976).

59. A bargaining unit is a group of employees whose interests are represented by an emhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/12
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ognized the importance of community of interest" by holding that public employees' right to separate bargaining units could not be negated
by the public employer.0 1 These guidelines were subsequently utilized
2
by a lower court in announcing unit determination guidelines, thus
furthering the impact of judicial decisions on the public-sector collective-bargaining process.
Although the legislative branch failed to provide Ohio with any
guidelines or procedures governing collective bargaining prior to S.
133, it is apparent that the judicial branch had taken an active role in
not only recognizing public employer-employee bargaining capacity
and authority, but also in delineating many guidelines and procedures
to be followed in Ohio's public-sector collective-bargaining process.
III. PROVISIONS OF S. 133
Against the background of existing public-sector collective-bargaining activity supervised only by judicial guidelines concerning rights
and procedures, the Ohio General Assembly passed S. 133. This bill is
a comprehensive statute delineating labor relations between public employers6 8 and public employees.64 The general assembly has established
rights65 and obligations" of both parties; created guidelines for unit
determination;67 provided procedures concerning exclusive representa-

ployee union. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.05-.06 (Page Supp. 1983). Accordingly, the
determination of which employees will constitute a bargaining unit is an important determination
since different types of employees may have competing interests.
60. "Community of interest" means that the employees of a particular unit have similar
interests. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 254 (5th ed. 1979).
61. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 27, 356 N.E.2d at 302.
62. Ohio Ass'n of Pub. School Employees v. Cleveland City Bd. of Educ., 69 Ohio App. 2d
101, 430 N.E.2d 1335 (1980).
63. "Public employer" is defined as:
the state or any political subdivision of the state located entirely within the state including,
without limitation, any municipal corporation with a population of at least five thousand
[a] county, township with a population of at least five thousand in the unincorporated
area of the township . . . [a] school district, state institution of higher learning, any public
or special district, any state agency, authority, commission, or board, or other branch of
public employment.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(B) (Page Supp. 1983).
64. "Public employee" is defined as:
any person holding a position by appointment or employment in the service of a public
employer, including any person working pursuant to a contract between a public employer
and a private employer and over whom the National Labor Relations Board has declined
jurisdiction on the basis that the involved employees are employees of a public employer
Id. § 4117.01(C).
65. Id. § 4117.03.
66. Id. § 4117.04.
Published
1983
§ 4117.08.
Id. eCommons,
67. by

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 9:3

tion6 s by an employee organization; 69 defined many aspects of the collective-bargaining process;7 0 defined unfair labor practices;7 and provided impasse procedures, 72 including a limited right to strike7 3 and
binding arbitration.7 4 The act will certainly spur litigation and require
75
judicial interpretation.
After establishing the parties affected by the act 7 6 S. 133 delineates the rights and obligations of the parties involved. Generally, public
employees have the right to (1) join or refrain from joining any employee organization; (2) engage in activity for the purpose of collective
bargaining; (3) be represented by an employee organization; (4) bargain collectively with their public employer; and (5) present grievances
and have them adjusted.7 7 While these rights are specifically guaranteed by the act, the judiciary may apply a narrower scope to these
rights than applied in the private sector, deferring to the interests of
public policy which permeate public-sector employment. 8
S. 133 also delineates the obligations of the public employer.7 9 The
bill establishes that a public employer is obliged to extend to the employee organization8" the right of exclusive representation of a bargaining unit for a period of at least twelve months following certification,81
and if the parties enter an agreement, for a period of no more than
three years from the date of the agreement. 8 This bill therefore mandates that once exclusive representation is certified, the public employer
must bargain in good faith with the representative. To understand the
extent of its duties, the public employer must consider Ohio Revised

68. Id. § 4117.05.
69. "Employee organization" is defined as "any labor or bona fide organization in which
public employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
public employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours, terms and other conditions
of employment." Id. § 4117.01(D).
70. Id. §§ 4117.08-.10.
71. Id. § 4117.11.
72. Id. § 4117.14.
73. Id. § 4117.14(D)(2).
74. Id. § 4117.14(D)(1).
75. Since many of the provisions of S. 133 parallel the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), National Labor Relation Board decisions may prove
beneficial in interpreting the provisions of S. 133. See generally J. LEwis & S. SPIRN, supra note
15. A full discussion of this conclusion is beyond the scope of this legislation note. However, a
general comparison of the two acts will reveal striking similarities. Id.
76. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.01 (Page Supp. 1983).
77. Id. § 4117.03(A)(1)-(5).
78. J. LEWIS & S. SPIRN, supra note 15, at 43.
79. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.04 (Page Supp. 1983).
80. The bill provides specific guidelines regarding certification of an employee organization.
Id. § 4117.05.
81. Id. § 4117.04(A).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/12
82. Id.

19841

LEGISLATION NOTES

Code section 4117.0883 which delineates the scope of bargaining. Failure to follow these rules may result in the finding of an unfair labor
practice, s4 and thereby subject the employer to the appropriate
8 5
sanctions.
Determination of the appropriate employee unit" is a key
nation since all rights of the employees are protected through
and all rights and obligations delineated in the bill are phrased
ence to the exclusive representative of this "unit." The act

determithis unit
in referprovides

that the State Employment Relations Board8 7 (SERB) determines the
appropriate unit for collective-bargaining purposes." In determining
the appropriateness of a unit, the board is specifically required to consider, among other relevant factors, the desires of employees, wages,
hours, working conditions, any community of interest, the administrative structure of the employer, the efficiency of operations, the effect of
over-fragmentation, and the history of collective bargaining.89 The act
places limitations upon the SERB's determination by specifically providing that certain combinations of employees do not constitute appropriate units.90 For example, a unit consisting of professional and nonprofessional employees would not constitute an appropriate unit and is
therefore statutorily prohibited. 9 ' Nothing in the provision excludes
multi-unit bargaining. 9' One should note, however, that the SERB's de83. Section 4117.08 of the Ohio Revised Code delineates the scope of bargaining. See also
infra text accompanying notes 100-04..
84. Unfair labor practices, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.11 (Page Supp. 1983), are discussed later in this note. See infra text accompanying notes 117-23.
85. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.12 (Page Supp. 1983). See also J. LEWIS & S. SPIRN,
supra note 15, at 45.
86. See supra note 59.
87. The SERB implements and administers rules and hearings made necessary under the
act. This three-member appointive board is by far the most important panel created by S. 133.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.02 (Page Supp. 1983) (creates the SERB and lists its powers and
duties).
On November 28, 1983, Governor Richard F. Celeste appointed the first State Employment
Relations Board. The appointees are: Theodore Dyke, labor law professor at Cleveland State University; Helen Fix, former Cincinnati state representative; and William Sheehan, executive secretary-treasurer of Cincinnati AFL-CIO and vice president of Ohio AFL-CIO. Since the board
positions are full-time, the appointees will be required to discontinue their current private employment or take a leave of absence. Columbus Dispatch, Nov. 29, 1983, at B2, col. 1.
88. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05 (Page Supp. 1983).
89. Id. § 4117.06(B).
90. Id. § 4117.06(D)(1)-(6).
91. Id. § 4117.06(D)(1). This section also creates an exception to the general rule. The
section will permit the creation of a unit consisting of both professional and nonprofessional employees if a majority of both votes for inclusion in the same unit. Id.
92. Id. Multi-unit bargaining permits multiple employers to act as a single employer for the
purposes of collective bargaining, with the exclusive representative of all employees in one unit. J.
Published
by eCommons, 1983
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termination of the appropriate unit is final and unappealable.93
After the SERB has designated the appropriate unit, all negotiations concerning the rights and obligations of the employees of that
unit are conducted through an employee organization which is established as the exclusive representative of that particular unit. Unless an
organization has attained the status of being an "exclusive representative" of a public-employee bargaining unit, the public employer has no
duty to negotiate with that representative. 4 An employee organization
may gain exclusive representation status in one of two ways: by election
or by recognition procedures. 9" The election procedure requires that the
organization be certified by the SERB after a majority of the voting
employees select the employee organization as their exclusive representative in a board-conducted election.' The recognition procedure requires that the employee organization be recognized by the public employer and then certified by the SERB.'7 The act supplies a detailed
procedure regarding employer recognition, which provides for rebuttal
by the public employees within the particular unit which the organization wishes to represent. 98 Once an employee organization attains the
status of "exclusive representative" by one of these methods, it remains
the exclusive representative for a minimum of one year from the date
of certification, and if an agreement is subsequently reached, for a
maximum of three years from the date of the agreement. 9
The act places an obligation upon the employer to bargain collectively with the exclusive representative of the public-employee unit in
good faith.10 0 This collective-bargaining procedure is a crucial part of
the statute, in that almost all other sections of S. 133 revolve around
collective bargaining. As stated by the Ohio General Assembly, to
"bargain collectively" means
to perform the mutual obligation of the public employer, by its representatives, and the representatives of its employees to negotiate in good
faith at reasonable times and places with respect to wages, hours, terms
93. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.06(A) (Page Supp. 1983).
94. In pertinent part, § 4117.04(A) states: "Public employers shall extend to an exclusive
representative . . . the right to represent exclusively the employees in the appropriate bargaining
unit and the right to exclusive representation .
Id. § 4117.04(A). See infra text accompanying notes 100-04.
95. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(A) (Page Supp. 1983).
96. A board-conducted election is defined in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.07(C) (Page
Supp. 1983).
97. Id. § 4117.05(A)(2).
98. Id.
99. Id. § 4117.04(A). See also OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERv. COMM'N, BILL ANALYSIS: AM.
SUB. S.B. 133, at 6 (1983) [hereinafter cited as BILL ANALYSIS) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 79-85.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/12
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and other conditions of employment and the continuation, modification,
or deletion of an existing provision of a collective bargaining agreement,
with the intention of reaching an agreement, or to resolve questions arising under the agreement. This includes executing a written contract incorporating the terms of any agreement reached. The obligation to bargain collectively does not mean that either party is compelled to agree to
a proposal nor does it require the making of a concession. 0

Although this definition is broad and may incorporate almost all aspects of employment, the bill specifically reserves certain matters to the
public employer's sole discretion. 10 2 These matters are therefore not appropriate subjects for collective bargaining. The act also provides that
other matters concerning inherent managerial policy' 0 3 are not topics of
1 4
collective bargaining unless the public employer agrees otherwise. 0
S. 133 promulgates further guidelines concerning collective bargaining by specifying "required" and "permitted" provisions in the ultimate collective-bargaining agreement.'" Every agreement is required
to contain (1) a grievance procedure which may end in binding arbitration ' 0 and (2) a provision authorizing the public employer to deduct
fees or dues of members of the employee organization upon a written
authorization by the employee.1 07 The ultimate agreement may not
contain (1) a provision for a "union shop"' 08 and (2) an expiration date
beyond three years (although the agreement may be extended). 10 9 Section 4117.09(C) also provides several "permissive" provisions'1 which
may be included in the ultimate agreement.
Once an exclusive representative and a public employer arrive at
an ultimate agreement, the legislative body" 1 of the public jurisdiction

101. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(G) (Page Supp. 1983).
102. Matters left to employer discretion include the conduct and grading of civil service
examinations, eligibility lists, and original appointments from lists. Id. § 4117.08(B).
103. For a brief synopsis of matters which constitute inherent managerial policy, see id. §
4117.08(C)(1).
104. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.08(C) (Page Supp. 1983).
105. Id. § 4117.09.
106. Id. § 4117.09(B)(1).
107. Id. § 4117.09(B)(2).
108. Id. § 4117.09(C). A "union shop" provision "would require as a condition of employment that every employee in a bargaining unit become and remain a member of the employee
organization." BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 99, at 9.
109. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.09(D) (Page Supp. 1983).
110. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.09(C) (Page Supp. 1983). The bill states that it is
permissible to include a provision which requires employees who are not members of the employee
organization to pay a fair-share fee. Id. This requirement is based on the presumption that the
organization has a legal duty to protect the interests of all employees within the bargaining unit,
including those who refrain from union membership.
111. "Legislative body includes the General Assembly, the governing board of a municipal
corporation,
district, college
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must approve the contract." 2 Accordingly, the public employer must
submit the agreement to the legislative body, and the legislative body
may either accept or reject the agreement." 3 In addition, the act specifically requires submission of a request for funds to implement an
agreement, as well as a request for approval of any other matter requiring approval by the legislative body. " 4 S. 133 establishes the time requirements of these submissions to the legislative body," 5 and further
provides that in the event of a rejection of the proposed agreement,
either party (the employer or employee organization) may reopen
negotiations.116
Section 4117.11," which defines unfair labor practices, is one of
the act's most important provisions.1" s This section specifically defines
what conduct establishes an unfair labor practice on the part of both
the employer"1 9 and the employee. 20 Ohio's General Assembly has delegated to the SERB the authority to hold hearings' 2 ' and issue orders "2' 2 in relation to alleged unfair practices. Because of the importance of this section and its relevance to the many labor disputes
certain to arise, it is sure to create numerous controversies and much
12 3
litigation.
Unfair labor practices will not be the exclusive source of public
controversy. The bulk of public controversy surrounding S. 133 stems
from the inclusion of section 4117.14, which details the impasse procedures to be followed by the public employer and the exclusive representative of the public employees."' Specifically, section 4117.14 grants
certain public employees the limited right to strike, 2 6 and others the
right to seek binding arbitration.' 2

ers or any other body that has authority to approve the budget of their public jurisdiction." Id. §
4117.10(B).
112. Id.
113. Id.§ 4117.10(C).
114. Id.§ 4117.10(B).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.§ 4117.11.
118. J. LEwIs & S. SPIRN, supra note 15, at 75.
119. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.11(A) (Page Supp. 1983) establishes what conduct of
an employer constitutes an unfair labor practice.
120. Section 4117.11(B) establishes what conduct of an employee organization constitutes
an unfair labor practice.
121. Id. § 4117.12(B).
122. Id.§ 4117.13(A).
123. J. LEWIS & S. SPIRN, supra note 15, at 75.
124. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14 (Page Supp. 1983).
125. Id. § 4117.14(D)(2). Public employees other than those listed in (D)(1) of this section
have the right to strike.
126. The section reads in part:

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/12
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IV.

RIGHT TO STRIKE

S. 133 was promulgated primarily in response to the reality that
the Ferguson Act"17 was an ineffective means of dealing with publicsector employment relations.12 8 State Senator Eugene Branstoo1129

stated that "[i]t is clear that Ohio's current Ferguson Act is not working. Although it is illegal under Ohio Law for public employees to
strike, Ohio has the third highest public employee strike rate in the

country."' 3"
Statistical data support Senator Branstool's assessment of Ohio's
public-sector labor problem. Historically, Ohio has long been plagued
with numerous public-sector work stoppages. In 1977, Ohio led the nation in public-sector work stoppages with sixty-two.' 3 ' The following
year, the number of public-sector work stoppages in Ohio increased to
sixty-seven;' however, both Michigan and Pennsylvania experienced13 a
greater number of public work stoppages that year with seventy-four
and sixty-nine 13 4 public-sector strikes, respectively. In 1979, Ohio was
the fourth highest public-sector work stoppage state with fifty-six" 35
strikes, but ranked third again in 1980 with sixty strikes."13
Despite the prohibition of public-employee strikes in the Ferguson

Public employees, who are members of a police or fire department, members of the
state highway patrol, deputy sheriffs, dispatchers employed by a police, fire or sheriff's
department or the state highway patrol or civilian dispatchers employed by a public employer other than a police, fire, or sheriff's department to dispatch police, fire, sheriff's
department, or emergency medical or rescue personnel and units, an exclusive nurse's unit,
employees of the state school for the deaf or the state school for the blind, employees of
any public employee retirement system, corrections officers, guards at penal or mental institutions, special policemen or policewomen appointed in accordance with Sections
5119.14 and 5123.13 of the Revised Code, Psychiatric attendants employed at mental
health forensic facilities, or youth leaders employed at juvenile correctional facilities, shall
submit the matter to a final offer settlement procedure ....
Id. § 4117.14(D)(1).
127. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-.05 (Page 1980), repealed by Act of July 7, 1983,
§ 2, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-237, 5-245 (Baldwin).
128. Interview with Neil Zimmers, Ohio state senator, in Dayton, Ohio (Sept. 19, 1983).
129. State Senator Eugene Branstool was the prime sponsor of Senate Bill 133. He also
serves on the Commerce and Labor Committee. 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 2-8 (Baldwin).
130. Branstool, Senator, Former Mayor Debate Bargaining Bill, Columbus Dispatch, June
28, 1983, at B3, col. 1.
131. Note, Collective Bargaining, Impasse Resolution & Strikes in the Public Sector: A
Recommendation to Amend Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 150E, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV.
505, 540 (1981).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 539.
134. Id. at 538.
135: BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT No. 629, WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, 1979, at 10 (Mar. 1981) [hereinafter cited as WORK STOPPAGES, 1979].
136. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN No. 2120, ANALYSIS
OF WORK STOPPAGES, 1980, at 53 (Mar. 1982) [hereinafter cited as WORK STOPPAGES, 1980].
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Act,1" 7 Ohio public employees continued to strike at an alarming
rate.1 3 8 This problem is not unique to Ohio, however. In 1980, there
were 536 state public-employee strikes in the United States."'9 All but
eight states 4 prohibit strikes by public employees. However, in 1980,
those states which granted a limited right to strike accounted for only
101 of the 536 public-sector strikes."' This data clearly indicates that
the mere illegality of a strike has little if any deterrent effect on public
employees. Public employees will in fact resort to strikes as a means of
settling impasses or redressing grievances.
Despite the apparent inadequacies of the Ferguson Act, opponents
of S. 133 vehemently criticize the right to strike in the public sector.
John M. Brandt, director of legislative services of the Ohio School
Boards Association, believes that strikes are bad public policy for the
state of Ohio.142 According to Brandt, "[ejxperience . . . [has shown]
that legalizing strikes is likely to increase the number of strikes, resulting in the disruption of services that the taxpayers have paid for and
have a right to depend on." 4 ' Further criticism of the strike provisions
comes from the president of the Akron Board of Education:
We cannot hope to diminish the number of public strikes by repealing a
law prohibiting strikes and providing a new law legalizing strikes. Many
law abiding public employees would never strike so long as it was a violation of law; Senate Bill 133 will make many employees more willing to
strike.""
Relevant statistical information does not support the views of those
who oppose S. 133 and its strike provisions. The evidence clearly indicates that granting a right to strike does not increase the frequency of
public-sector work stoppages. 46 Of the eight states which currently
grant public employees a limited right to strike,1 46 only Pennsylvania
suffers from a high number of public-employee work stoppages. 14 7 The
137. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-.05 (Page 1980), repealed by Act of July 7, 1983,
§ 2, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-237, 5-245 (Baldwin).
138. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
139. WORK STOPPAGES, 1979, supra note 135, at 53.
140. Currently eight states grant public employees a limited right to strike. See supra note
9.
141. WORK STOPPAGES, 1980, supra note 136, at 53.
142. Testimony of John M. Brandt, director of legislative services of the Ohio School
Boards Association 3 (June 14, 1983) (testimony on S. 133 before the House Commerce and
Labor Committee) [hereinafter cited as Brandt] (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
143. Id.
144. Testimony of the Reverend Eugene E. Morgan, Jr., president, Akron Board of Education 3 (June 1, 1983) (testimony on S. 133) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
145. See infra text accompanying notes 148-49; see also Note, supra note 131, at 534-35.
146. See supra note 7.
147. Note, supra note 131, at 538.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/12
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overwhelming majority of those states which have enacted prostrike
statutes' 4 8 have experienced no noticeable increase in public-sector
work stoppages. 4 9
Fear of an increasingnumber of strikes is not the only concern of
opponents of S. 133. Opponents also rely on the traditional fear of public strikes-that such work stoppages may paralyze the government. 150
When one considers the already high number of annual public work
stoppages which have not resulted in governmental paralysis it can easily be seen that this argument is without merit. Public-sector work
stoppages under the Ferguson Act have not resulted in governmental
paralysis; likewise, it is reasonable to conclude that strikes under S. 133

will not result in governmental paralysis. It is not the intent of S. 133
to encourage strikes or foster a governmental shutdown. This is clearly
evidenced by the fact that the right to strike is not extended to all
public employees, but rather is extended only to those employees not

employed in the health and safety field.'' S. 133 further protects
against governmental paralysis by making available a temporary restraining order which can be granted by the court of common pleas
when a lawful strike creates a clear and present danger to the health or
safety of the public.'

148.

See supra note 9.

149.

Note, supra note 131, at 534-35.

150. Comment, Labor Law: Sympathy Strikes under the Minnesota Public Employment
Relations Act, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1023, 1031 (1979).
151. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D)(2) (Page Supp. 1983).

152. The temporary restraining order provision reads:
(A) Whenever the public employer believes that a lawful strike creates clear and present danger to the health or safety of the public, the public employer may petition the
court of common pleas having jurisdiction over the parties to issue a temporary restraining
order enjoining the strike. If the court finds probable cause to believe that the strike may
be a clear and present danger to the public health or safety, it has jurisdiction to issue a
temporary restraining order, not to exceed seventy-two hours, enjoining the strike.
Should a court issue a temporary restraining order, the public employer shall immediately request authorization of the State Employment Relations Board to enjoin the strike
beyond the effective period of the temporary restraining order. The Board shall determine
within the effective period of the temporary restraining order whether the strike creates a
clear and present danger to the health or safety of the public.
If the Board finds that a clear and present danger exists, the common pleas court
which issued the temporary restraining order has jurisdiction to issue orders to further
enjoin the strike. However, the court shall make provisions in any injunction or other order
issued beyond the temporary restraining order for the automatic termination of the injunction or other order at the end of sixty days following the end of the temporary restraining
order or when an agreement is reached, whichever occurs first. Thereafter, no court has
jurisdiction to issue any further injunction or other orders pursuant to this section. The
order of the court is appealable as provided in the Appellate Rules.
(B) Whenever a court of common pleas has issued an order, other than a temporary
restraining order, under division (A) of this section enjoining acts or practices which create
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Contrary to critics' predictions, S. 133 could actually reduce the
number of strikes by public employees. James A. Monroe, the executive
director of the Ohio Civil Service Employees Association, has indicated
that S. 133 "provides for workable alternatives to strikes which never
before were available to public employees. The fact finding and arbitration provisions will go far towards eliminating the frustrations which
heretofore resulted in strikes. ' 15 3 Prior to this legislation, Ohio did not
have a comprehensive bargaining statute. Under the Ferguson Act, a
governmental entity had no duty to bargain with an employee representative.""4 S. 133 not only requires the public employer and the publicemployee representative to engage in good-faith collective bargaining,
but also encourages the parties to settle their disputes long before the
right to strike will accrue.S5 Therefore, S. 133 should not be characterized as a "right to strike" bill, but rather as a reasonable means to deal
with public-sector labor relations concerns on a statewide basis. 5 6
Section 4117.14 encompasses many alternatives to strikes and encourages settlements to be made long before public employees could
strike. Upon the receipt of notice, 5 7 the public employer and the pubgiving rise to the order shall engage in collective bargaining for a period of sixty days from
the date of the order or until agreement is reached, whichever occurs first. The parties shall
collectively bargain with the assistance of a mediator appointed by the Board. The mediator, at his discretion, may require that the parties collectively bargain in public or in private. At any time after there has been forty-five days of collective bargaining and no agreement has been reached, the mediator may make public a report on the current position of
the parties to the dispute and the efforts which have been made for settlement. The report
shall include a statement by each party of its position and a statement of the employee
organization's and public employer's offers of settlement.
Id. § 4117.16.
153. Testimony of James A. Monroe, executive director of the Ohio Civil Service Employees Association 8 (June 14, 1983) (testimony on S. 133 before the House Commerce and Labor
Committee) [hereinafter cited as Monroe] (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
154. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-.05 (Page 1980), repealed by Act of July 7, 1983,
§ 2,1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-237, 5-245 (Baldwin).
155. See infra notes 158-69 and accompanying text.
156. Testimony of Donald K.Day, first vice president of AFSCME Ohio Council 8 (June
14, 1983) (testimony on S.133 before the House Commerce and Labor Committee) (on file with
University of Dayton Law Review).
157. The notice provision reads:
(B)(I) In those cases where there exists a collective bargaining agreement, any public
employer or exclusive representative desiring to terminate, modify, or negotiate a successor
collective bargaining agreement shall:
(a) Serve written notice upon the other party of the proposed termination, modification, or successor agreement. The party must serve the notice not less than sixty days prior
to the expiration date of the existing agreement or, in the event the existing collective
bargaining agreement does not contain an expiration date, not less than sixty days prior to
the time it is proposed to make the termination or modifications or to make effective a
successor agreement.
(b) Offer to bargain collectively with the other party for the purpose of modifying or
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/12
terminating any existing agreement or negotiating a successor agreement;
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lic-employee representative shall enter into collective bargaining.16 8 If
the parties cannot reach an agreement, they may, at any time prior to
the expiration of the collective-bargaining agreement, submit the issues
in dispute to any mutually agreed upon dispute-settlement
procedure.1 5 '
If the parties are unable to reach an agreement fifty days prior to
the expiration of the collective-bargaining agreement, either party may
request the SERB to intervene. 160 Upon such request, the board shall
intervene and investigate the dispute to determine whether the parties
Forty-five days before the exhave engaged in collective bargaining.'
piration of the collective-bargaining agreement, or if an impasse exists,
the board shall appoint a mediator to assist the parties in the collectivebargaining process.' 6
If the mediator advises that an impasse does exist, or not later
than thirty-one days prior to the expiration date of the collective-bargaining agreement, the board shall appoint a fact-finding panel.' 63 It

(c) Notify the State Employment Relations Board of the offer by serving upon the
board a copy of the written notice to the other party and a copy of the existing collective
bargaining agreement.
(2) In the case of initial negotiations between a public employer and an exclusive
representative, where a collective bargaining agreement has not been in effect between the
parties, any party may serve notice upon the board and the other party setting forth the
names and addresses of the parties and offering to meet, for a period of ninety days, with
the other party for the purpose of negotiating a collective bargaining agreement.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(B)(I)-(2) (Page Supp. 1983).
158. Id. § 4117.14(B)(4).
159. The applicable dispute-settlement provision reads:
(I) The procedures may include:
(a) Conventional arbitration of all unsettled issues;
(b) Arbitration confined to a choice between the last offer of each party to the agreement as a single package;
(c) Arbitration confined to a choice of the last offer of each party to the agreement on
each issue submitted;
(d) The procedures described in division (C)(I)(a), (b), or (c) of this section and
including among the choices for the arbitrator, the recommendations of the fact finder, if
there are recommendations, either as a single package or on each issue submitted;
(e) Settlement by a citizens' conciliation council composed of three residents within
the jurisdiction of the public employer. The public employer shall select one member and
the exclusive representative shall select one member. The two members selected shall select
the third member who shall chair the council. If the two members cannot agree upon a
third member within five days after their appointments, the Board shall appoint the third
member. Once appointed, the Council shall make a final settlement of the issues submitted
to it pursuant to division (G)of this section.
(f) Any other dispute settlement procedure mutually agreed to by the parties.
Id. § 4117.14(C)(I)(a)-(f).
160. Id. § 4117.14(C)(2).
161. Id.
162. Id.
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shall be the duty of the fact-finding panel to gather facts and make
recommendations for the resolution of the matter. 164 The board may
continue mediation, order the parties to engage in collective bargaining
until the expiration date of the agreement, or both. 6
The fact-finding panel must submit its findings of facts and recommendations on the unresolved issues to each party within fourteen days
of its inception.? 6 Within seven days after the findings of facts and
recommendations are sent, either side may reject the recommendations
by a vote of three-fifths of its total membership. 167 If neither party rejects the recommendations, they shall be deemed agreed upon as the
final resolution of the issue submitted, and a collective-bargaining
agreement shall be executed between the two parties, including the
fact-finding panel's recommendations.' 8
Only after all of these procedures have been exhausted, and the
exclusive representative has given ten days prior written notice of an
intent to strike to the public employer and to the board,' " may a public employee170 strike. These alternatives to strike17 1 were never before
enjoyed in Ohio.17 2 A public employee had virtually no choice under
the Ferguson Act but to resort to an illegal strike in the event of a
grievance or impasse. Therefore, S. 133 could reduce strikes in the public sector.

164. Id. § 4117.14(C)(3)(a). "The board shall by its rules require each party to specify in
writing the unresolved issues and its position on each issue to the fact-finding panel."
Section 4117.14(C)(4) establishes the guidelines for the fact-finding panel. The following guidelines apply to fact-finding:
(a) The fact-finding panel may establish times and places of hearings which shall be, where
feasible, in the jurisdiction of the state.
(b) The fact-finding panel shall conduct the hearing pursuant to the rules established by
the board.
(c) Upon request of the fact-finding panel, the board shall issue subpoenas for the hearings
conducted by the panel.
(d) The fact-finding panel may administer oaths.
(e) The board shall prescribe guidelines for the fact-finding panel to follow in making findings. In making its recommendations, the fact-finding panel shall take into consideration
the factors listed in divisions (G)(7)(a) to (f) of this section.
(f) The fact-finding panel may attempt mediation at any time during the fact-finding process. From the time of appointment until the fact-finding panel makes a final recommendation, it shall not discuss the recommendations for the settlement of the dispute with the
parties other than the direct parties to the dispute.
Id. § 4117.14(C)(4).
165. Id. § 4117.14(C)(3)(b).
166. Id. § 4117.14(C)(5).
167. Id. § 4117.14(C)(6).
168. Id.
169. Id. § 4117.14(D)(2).
170. Id.
171. See supra notes 158-69 and accompanying text.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/12
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The existence of a limited right to strike could also have the effect
of speeding labor negotiations and creating an air of cooperation in
public-sector labor relations. By granting public employees a limited
right to strike in Ohio, "employers would be reluctant to prolong negotiations and labor disputes would be more expeditiously terminated." '
The existence or threat of a strike is a primary motivator forcing parties with competing interests to make concessions over terms and conditions of employment." 4
V.

BINDING ARBITRATION

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of S. 133 is the provision
which provides public health and safety employees 175 with the right to
seek binding arbitration.1 76 At least one public employer, 17 7 the city of
Kettering, has stated that the right to strike for all public employees is
more favorable than compulsory binding arbitration. 17 8 Kettering
claims that compulsory arbitration changes collective bargaining "from
a communications process to a process of posturing so as to best influence a third party, the arbitrator, to render a favorable decision. '"19
The city of Kettering was not alone in its criticism of S. 133 and
its compulsory arbitration provision. Many arguments have been made
against the incorporation of the binding arbitration provision into S.
133. A primary fear of those opposed to binding arbitration is that it
will discourage open discussion, debate, and compromise by encouraging the parties to rely on the decision of the arbitrator as being
favorable to their position.180 The County Commissioners Association
of Ohio also criticized binding arbitration. The association claims that
it is not equitable to subject the public sector to binding arbitration
when the private sector is not subjected to the same burden.1 81 The
argument of the County Commissioners Association is supported by the
fact that the private sector is able to shift the cost of binding arbitration to the consumer through product pricing, 18 an alternative which
173. Note, supra note 131, at 537.
174. Olson, The Use of the Legal Right to Strike in the Public Sector, 33 LAB. L.J. 494

(1982).
175.
176.
177.
23, 1983)

OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D)(1) (Page Supp. 1983).
Id.
Testimony of Richard L. Strader, personnel director of the city of Kettering 2 (May
(before Ohio House of Representatives) (on file with University of Dayton Law

Review).
178.

Id.

179. Id.
180. Brandt, supra note 142.
181. Testimony of the County Commissioners Association of Ohio (May 23, 1983) (testimony on S. 133) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
182.by eCommons,
Id.
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the public sector does not enjoy.
The arguments presented against binding arbitration, though not
wholly without merit, overlook several important considerations. First,
the existence of binding arbitration for public health and safety employees is the final step in the collective-bargaining process. 18 3 Section
4117.14 of the Ohio Revised Code provides for the same impasse procedures prior to binding arbitration as are provided prior to the right to
strike-including fact-finding and mediation.'
The overall goal of S.
133 is not changed by the inclusion of the binding arbitration provision.
S. 133 seeks to facilitate a collective-bargaining agreement long before
the right to binding arbitration would be incurred.
Binding arbitration, on an issue by issue last best offer basis,8 5
might well have the effect of encouraging, rather than discouraging
open discussion, debate, and compromise. For example, as a prerequisite to this type of arbitration, the parties must bargain in good faith.'8 6
Also, since the arbitrator will be selecting the last best offer of one of
the two parties, it is in the best interest of each party to engage in open
discussion and debate and to submit the most reasonable final offer possible in light of all the surrounding factors.' 7 This result has been evidenced in several states which have enacted binding arbitration provisions. In Michigan, where final offer arbitration is followed, only ten to
fifteen percent of all firefighters and police contracts are ultimately settled by an arbitrated award. 88 Similar results have been experienced in
Iowa. 18 9 There, only 4.5 to 7.1% of all contract negotiations have resulted in arbitration awards. 90 In Minnesota, approximately thirty percent of all negotiations involving mediation for essential service employee disputes resulted in arbitration settlements.' 9' Experience
indicates that a binding arbitration provision is not a deterrent to open
debate and discussion which are essential to good collective bargaining;
rather, it is a last resort to be relied upon only when the employer and

183. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D)(1) (Page Supp. 1983).
184. See supra notes 158-69 and accompanying text.
185. Last best offer means that each party submits a last offer on all issues in dispute to the
conciliator. The conciliator then chooses the best of the two final offers on each of the issues as his
or her award.
186. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(B)(4) (Page Supp. 1983).
187. See infra note 78.
188. Gallagher, The Use of Interest Arbitrationin the Public Sector, 33 LAB. L.J. 501, 502
(1982). See Testimony of Robert 0. Mastin, Michigan state senator (June 14, 1983) (testimony
on S. 133) [hereinafter cited as Mastin] (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
189. Gallagher, supra note 188, at 502.
190. Id.
191. Brandt, supra note 142. See also supra note 144; Testimony of J. Steven Morris, city
manager of Eaton, Ohio (May 23, 1983) (testimony on S. 133 before the Commerce and Labor
Committee) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
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the exclusive representative cannot resolve their differences by other
means.
The principal criticism by opponents of binding arbitration concerns the nonaccountability of an independent arbitrator to the general
public. According to opponents, binding arbitration "removes the final
decision about salaries, fringe benefits, and other important issues from
local accountable officials, and gives those decisions to arbitrators who
never have to answer to voters or to anyone else.' 19 2 This loss of control
over local collective bargaining, according to opponents, will ultimately
devastate the budgets of all units of local government.' 93 This criticism
seems to be premised upon the assumption that an arbitrator makes an
award without considering the financial limitations of local government, and that such awards will exceed the budgetary limitations of
local governments. Undoubtedly, this is a legitimate concern; however,
it is not a concern ignored by S. 133.
The binding arbitration provision of S. 133 is not unresponsive to
the needs of local government. A careful examination of the binding
arbitration provision leads one to conclude that the provision is not
designed to adversely affect either of the parties; it is rather designed to
facilitate the most reasonable agreement possible in a fair and orderly
fashion.
The binding arbitration procedure begins after the conciliator is
selected to settle the dispute 1 9 and proceeds according to well-established guidelines. 95 First, the parties submit to final offer settlement
those issues that are subject to collective bargaining.'" The conciliator
then holds a hearing within thirty days after the board's order to submit to a final offer settlement procedure.'9 Not later than five days

192. Brandt, supra note 142.
193. Branstool, supra note 130, at B3, col. 4.
194. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D)(1) (Page Supp. 1983) governs the selection of
the conciliator. This section reads in part:
The parties shall request from the board a list of five qualified conciliators and the parties
shall select a single conciliator from the list by alternate striking of names. If the parties
cannot agree upon a conciliator within five days after the board order, the board shall on
the sixth day after its order appoint a conciliator from a list of qualified persons maintained
by the board or shall request a list of qualified conciliators from the American Arbitration
Association and appoint therefrom.
195. Id.§ 4117.14(G).
196. This section reads:
The parties shall submit to final offer settlement those issues that are subject to collective bargaining as provided by Section 4117.08 of the Revised Code and upon which the
parties have not reached agreement and other matters mutually agreed to by the public
employer and the exclusive representative; except that the conciliator may attempt mediation at any time.
Id. § 4117.14(G)(l).
197. Id. § 4117.14(G)(2).

Published by eCommons, 1983

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 9:3

prior to the hearing, each of the parties submit to the conciliator, the
opposing party, and the board a written report summarizing the unresolved issues, that party's final offer as to those issues, and the rationale for that position.1 9 8 The conciliator will hear the testimony from
both parties and consider the written report and recommendations of
the fact finder.' 99 Subsequent to this procedure, the conciliator will settle the dispute on an issue by issue basis, from each of the parties' final
offers.2 0
The conciliator is not free to make awards on an ad hoc basis. S.
133 requires the conciliator to consider certain factors 20 1 in making the
award. Specifically, the conciliator must consider the ability of the employer to finance and administer the issues proposed. 0 2 The effect of
this statutory obligation is to protect local governments from outrageous awards which could be devastating to their budgets. The conciliator must also be responsive to the needs of the general public. 203
Though in a technical sense the conciliator is not answerable to the
public in the same manner that an elected official is, he or she has a
statutory duty to consider the interests and welfare of the public. 2 0 4
Binding arbitration on a last best offer basis has proven successful
in other states. Since the enactment of the Michigan Compulsory Arbitration Act"0 ' in 1969, there has been only one strike involving a public
safety union in that state.'" In Ohio, there were eight strikes involving

198.
199.

Id.
Id.

§
§

4117.14(G)(3).
4117.14(G)(6).

200. Id. § 4117.14(G)(7).
201. In making his or her decision the conciliator must consider:
(a) Past collectively bargained agreements, if any, between the parties;
(b) Comparison of the issues submitted to final offer settlement relative to the employees in
the bargaining unit involved with those issues related to other public and private employees
doing comparable work, giving consideration to factors peculiar to the area and classification involved;
(c) The interests and welfare of the public, the ability of the public employer to finance
and administer the issues proposed, and the effect of the adjustments on the normal standard of public service;
(d) The lawful authority of the public employer;
(e) The stipulations of the parties;
(f) Such other factors, not confined to those listed in this section, which are normally or
traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of the issues submitted to final
offer settlement through voluntary collective bargaining, mediation, fact-finding, or other
impasse resolution procedures in the public service or in private employment.
Id. § 4117.14(G)(7)(a)-(f).
202. Id. § 4117.14(G)(7)(c).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.231-.242 (West 1978).
206. Mastin, supra note 188.
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the protection services in 1979 alone. 207 The following year, that figure
increased to seventeen work stoppages.2 0 8 This evidence suggests that
09
binding arbitration, when conducted within the proper constraints,
can be a very effective means of preventing the devastating effects that
could ensue from apolice or firefighter strike.
Whether binding arbitration is a desirable means of preventing
public-sector strikes or settling public labor disputes must be determined in light of the overall goals of collective bargaining. The purpose
of collective bargaining is to facilitate a fair agreement, reasonable to
both competing interests.21 0 A conciliator cannot-and should
not-become involved in the broader issues of governmental budgetary
policy. 211 Accordingly, a governmental body should not claim an absolute inability to pay a conciliator's award when in reality it is simply
unwilling to realign budgetary priorities in order to pay.212 Ohio certainly does not want its health and safety employees to engage in
strikes. Rather, stabilization of the work force is to be sought.2 3 Instead of an increase in the number of strikes, binding arbitration could
lead to an increase in public-worker morale and a rise in worker
productivity.""'
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although collective bargaining has occurred in Ohio without any
legislative framework governing the rights and obligations of the public

employer and employee, the general assembly has now furnished Ohio
with S. 133, a comprehensive statutory framework controlling all as-

pects of public employment relations in Ohio. Although some critics
question the desirability and potential effectiveness of the strike and
binding arbitration provisions contained in S. 133, there have been sufficiently positive results in other states with similar statutes to justify
their inclusion here. The right to strike and binding arbitration provisions could go far toward improving Ohio's public labor relations
problems. These provisions could in fact have the effect of decreasing
the tendency of public-employee strikes in Ohio's public sector. Additionally, the strike and binding arbitration provisions of S. 133 could
lead to an overall stabilization of Ohio's public-sector work force,

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

WORK STOPPAGES,
WORK STOPPAGES,

1979, supra note 135, at 16.
1980, supra note 136, at 60.

See supra note 201.
Rapid Roller Co. v. NLRB, 126 F.2d 452, 460 (7th Cir. 1942).
Mastin, supra note 188.
Id.
Monroe, supra note 153.
Id.
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which would enable local governments to more effectively provide essential community services.
John F. Haviland, Jr.
Colleen M. Hunt
Code Sections Affected: To amend sections 124.02-.03, 124.05, and
124.08, and to enact sections 4117.01-.05, and 4117.06-.23.
Effective Date: October 6, 1983.
Sponsor: Branstool (S)
Committees:

Commerce and Labor (H)
Commerce and Labor (S)
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